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Economic Sophistication in Nineteenth 
Century Congressional Tariff Debates 
We are lost at once amidst the jargon of the schools of political economy. 
Representative Mallory 
February 28, 1824 
(Annals of the Cong~ess) 
0 NE of the most controversial economic issues confronting the American public during the nineteenth century was that of pro- 
tection. The plea for a protective tariff had been raised as soon as 
the First Congress met in 1789. The issue was sharply debated off 
and on throughout the nineteenth century but never finally re- 
solved. There is now a large literature relating the outcome of this 
issue to the economic and political interests of various involved 
groups. 
Little effort has been made, however, to assess the impact of the 
tariff on economic growth, employment, and the dispersion of new 
technology. Nor has a close examination been made of the thought 
of Congressmen who participated in the tariff debates. To what ex- 
tent can one characterize those debates as informed by a knowledge 
of economic theory? What body of theory was available for them 
to draw upon? In short, what was the intellecutal basis as perceived 
and understood by the Congressmen themselves, of the tariff judg- 
ments which they made? 
This paper attempts to answer those questions by scrutinizing the 
tariff debates of 1824 and 1894 as case studies. Is there evidence in 
the debates to indicate that Congressmen were perceptive to the 
operation of a national economy? How economically knowledgeable 
were they? 
SOME PRELIMINARIES-A MI3THODOLOGY 
By "economic knowledge" I mean systemic, theoretical knowl- 
edge of the economy. As practical men, Congressmen knew a great 
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deal about those particular segments of the economy in which they 
were engaged or which affected them. My concern, however, is with 
the Congressmen's understanding of the economy as a system, their 
understanding not only of the parts but also of how the parts in- 
fluence each other. I t  is only this broader knowledge that is appro- 
priate for national policy formulation. 
There are several limitations to this study that must be noticed 
from the beginning. First, I shall not attempt to appraise the extent 
to which economic arguments were persuasive to the members or 
influential in determining votes. I shall ask only what economic 
knowledge was displayed and not how behavior was affected by 
it.l Second, I shall make no effort to trace the undoubted effects on 
the expressions of Congressmen of their constituents' economic in- 
terests. 
The third limitation is somewhat more serious methodologically. 
Because for each case study I wish to survey an entire Congress, I 
rely on the one source we have which records that Congress acting 
as a unit, namely the transcript of its debates. If an investigator were 
attempting to discover the economic knowledge of a certain member 
of those Congresses, it is clear that he would not confine his study to 
the man's speeches in Congress; in fact, it might be thought that 
these speeches, being nearly barren of direct economic exposition, 
would conceal more than they revealed of his expertise. However, 
because my task concerns two entire Congresses this paper must deal 
with the Congresses somewhat abstractly-treating them as if they 
were composed of two homogeneous parts, the tariff supporters and 
the free-traders. My concern is ascertaining whether or not there 
existed systems of "political economy" that underlay these two posi- 
tions, and if so, what they were. Therefore, despite the dangers 
mentioned above, I shall rely solely on these debates for my data. 
Further, I have limited this study to the debates in the House of 
Representatives, which always debates tariff bills before they go to 
the Senate. This limitation represents no serious restriction, since 
the House generated more genuine controversy, and the time con- 
straints placed on speakers kept the debates more germane. The 
source for the debates is the Congressional R e ~ o r d , ~  for the 1894 
1 If our concern were behavioral, we should have to investigate the considerable 
power of unsystematized ideas, even quite unsophisticated ones, to accomplish polit- 
ical objectives in a society which historically has been notable for its distrust of 
systematic thought. 
2 Congressional Record: Containing the Proceedings and Debates of the Fifty- 
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debates, and its predecessor, the Annuls of CongressS for the earlier 
debates. Although the Annuls is not quite a primary source, being a 
compilation of the Congressional stenographers' notes, it records 
nearly all of the debates verbatim, and thus there is no serious dis- 
crepancy between the Annuls and what the primary source might 
be considered to have been. 
Finally, this study must be qualified in two different ways, whose 
effects hopefully cancel each other out. The first is that the models 
described below result from an artificial synthesis of many men's 
ideas, and I cannot claim that any one Congressman had system- 
atized these ideas into a consistent model. What I do claim is that 
all of these ideas were present in the debates and were used to ad- 
vantage by the participants. The second qualification is that the 
"free-trade" and "pro-tariff' models come as much from an intuitive 
feel for the debates-derived from careful reading of the House 
proceedings for each debate-as from the quotations presented be- 
low. For every statement quoted that concisely states a relevant idea, 
there were many more that were less concise in statement or less 
precise in content. 
I have dealt at some length with these methodological problems 
because they appear particularly acute in such a study-necessarily 
qualitative and somewhat speculative-which involves abstracting 
economic models from speeches made for entirely different ends. 
Nevertheless, despite these limitations, the results are of consider- 
able interest. 
A t a r 8  primarily designed for protection was first seriously de- 
bated in the Congress of 1816. Domestic manufacturers had pros- 
pered during the period of non-tariff protection caused by the 
wartime collapse of international commerce. In 1816, with the re- 
turn of peace, the United States was flooded with foreign, primarily 
British, manufactured goods. There was general agreement in the 
Congress that some type of t a r8  was needed to ease the adjustment. 
The 1816 solution to the t a r8  question was ambiguous in terms 
of long-range policy. The Congressional debate focused on short-run 
Third Congress, Second Sesston (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1894), 
Parts I ,  11, and Appendix, Part I .  
3 The Annuls of the Congress of the United States, Eighteenth Congress, First 
Session (Washington: Gales and Seaton, 1854), Volumes 41 and 42. 
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adjustments, and that portion of the debate which did involve long- 
run policy was generaly desultory. In the following years there was 
increased pressure for general tariff protection for domestic industry 
-pressures that culminated in the election of the 18th Congress in 
1822, the first Congress elected under the census of 1820. In the first 
session, a major revision of the tariff was introduced into the House 
of Representatives. This tariff, known as the Tariff of 1824, was de- 
bated from December of 1823 until April of 1824. 
The debates cover roughly a thousand pages in the Annals, al- 
though for each side of the principal substantive arguments were 
articulated by a few major speakers. The final vote passing the bill 
strikingly demonstrated the regional codict of interests. Each of 
the twelve proto-industrial Central States voted overwhelmingly in 
favor of the bill, and as a group provided a 95 to 10 margin in favor: 
Eleven other states, the mercantile Northeast and agricultural South, 
all voted solidly against the bill, producing an 84 to 6 bulge in op- 
position.' Only the Maryland delegation was closely split, voting 5 
to 4 against the bill6 A considerable portion of the debate was de- 
voted to general economic principles; consequently, the passage of 
the bill may be correctly interpreted as the result of the considered 
economic judgment of that Congress concerning a policy of long- 
range protection. It is these debates, then, that I employ for my fist 
case study. 
One can begin his search for underlying economic conceptions, 
or what will loosely be called models, by focusing first on the eco- 
nomic writers mentioned in the debates. My purpose is not to test 
how much history of thought the Congress knew; rather, by review- 
ing their intellectual precursors, hopefully we can gain clues as to 
their own conceptual schemes. 
Foremost was, of course, Adam Smith. The Wealth of Nations, 
published first in 1776, appears to have been common and almost 
required reading, as judged by the frequency with which Smith's 
name appears in the debates. His name is explicitly used at least 
eight different times by different speakers: and many more refer- 
4 Rhode Island, Connecticut, Vermont, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, 
Deleware, Kentucky, Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, and Missouri. 
5 Maine, New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, 
Georgia, Te~essee ,  Louisiana, Mississip i, and Alabama. 
8 The final vote is reported in AD&, pp 2429-2430. Congressmen can be iden- 
tified from Rapine, D., Congressional Directory, for the Second Session of the 
Eighteenth Congress of the United States, (Washington City, 1824). 
7 A n d ,  pp. 1559, 1678, 2178, 2222, 2233, 2372, 2391, 2403. 
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ences are clearly directed to him (e.g., "Buy where you can buy 
cheapest, is the maxim of the political economi~t"~). Smith's argu- 
ments for free trade naturally suited those opposed to the tariff, and 
his enormous infiuence in ordering their thinking will be noticed 
later. 
Ricardo's Principles of Political Economy and Taxation did not 
appear until 1817, and although some of his pamphlets were avail- 
able earlier, his name is not mentioned frequently. Because the 
Principles is more purely theoretical than Wealth of Nations, it had 
less appeal for the Congress. The free-trade group recognized that 
Ricardo's work provided an intellectual underpinning for its posi- 
tionY9 but from the references to the work it appears that while 
respected, its content remained generally obscure to the debate par- 
ticipants. 
J. B. Say's Trait6 had some circulation among members of the 
Congress, and perhaps it was through Say that most of Smith's argu- 
ments became known. Likewise, the "celebrated Malthus"lo was 
generally recognized as a political economist of considerable stature. 
There is little assurance that the speakers who appealed to these 
latter economists had ever read their works, but they were at least 
aware of the arguments presented by them. In any event, Adam 
Smith's name appears to have been most prestigious, and his work 
was clearly the most influential. 
The works of these economists have since been accepted as gen- 
uine contributions to economic theory. Given the prevailing intel- 
lectual disfavor of tariffs, the tariff supporters were generally wont 
to dismiss political economists as "abstract and theoretical"ll or "for- 
eign speculative writers."12 One economist, Sir James Steuart, had 
received considerable notice from the tariff advocates in the 1816 
debates, since his Political Oeconomy provided some support for 
the tariff position.13 By 1824, the theoretical triumph of the free- 
traders was so complete that not only was Steuart's name not in- 
voked, but the balance-of-trade doctrine was called "idle and ridic- 
ulous, . . . exploded by all the enlightened political economists of 
8 Ibid., p. 1476. 
9 Ibid., pp. 2144,2233,2235,2372. 
10 Ibid., p. 1682. 
11 Ibid., p. 2069. 
12 Ibid., p. 1474. 
13 See S. R. Sen, The Economics of Sir James Steuart (Cambridge, Mass.: Har- 
vard University Press, 1957). 
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the day."14 However, Steuart's work continued to influence the de- 
bates in fact if not in name. 
Aside from these more theoretical writers, the Congress of 1824 
was familiar with many of the popular and contemporary economic 
writers. Joseph Lowe15 was particularly studied because he pre- 
sented some of the most valuable of the few available statistics- 
those on British customs and currency. Both sides in the debate 
made repeated reference to Lowe's work. Colquhoun16 was popular 
because he presented empirical matter in analytic terms; he at- 
tempted ". . . to paraphrase factually, as it were, the more popular 
doctrines of the times."17 Laborde, Count Nesselrode, Matthew 
Carey, and Dr. Seybert, contemporary American and European 
economic observers, and were all quoted and used. 
We see, then, that the Congress was generally familiar with both 
the theoretic writings and the more popular contemporary materials. 
On the free-trade side, the theorists had gained such sway as to 
sweep the opposition from the field; by 1824, there were no intel- 
lectually respectable writers supporting the tariff position, so tariff 
advocates were forced to depend upon the "practical statesmen" of 
the day or upon such authors as Nesselrode and Lowe, who were 
mostly problem-oriented. We shall later see this split mirrored in 
the differing degrees of completeness manifested by the conceptual 
schemes of the two groups. 
The Free Trade Position 
Let us now examine closely those conceptions that underlay the 
free-trade arguments. We can view in detail the previously noted 
intellectual debt owed to Adam Smith. 
The "Real" Model. First, the free-traders had a clear Smithian 
conception of the nature of national wealth: "The wealth of a nation 
consists in the abundance of those articles which administer to the 
necessities, the comforts, and the luxuries of life, according to the 
existing habits of society."ls This notion of wealth, frequently re- 
peated, is plainly free from any bullionist concept of wealth. But, 
more importantly, it implies that anything that increases the stock 
14  Buchanan quoting Webster, Annals, p. 1891. 
16 Ibid., pp. 1923,1931, 1940, 1974, 1997,2021,2071. 
18 Ibid., p. 2248. 
17  J. A. Schumpeter, Histoy of Economic Analysis (New York: Oxford University 
Press. 1954 ) . D. 522n. 
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of "those articles" increases the national wealth.lg This implication, 
though seemingly simple, is of considerable importance to the early 
nineteenth century legislator. In the first place, it induced the free- 
traders to begin asking relevant questions (e.g., what causes the 
stock of "those articles" to increase?). But, more important, by focus- 
ing on real goods rather than their money values, this concept of 
wealth removed from the analysis the economic element most con- 
fusing to the legislator: the relation of prices and the value of money 
to production and income. I t  allowed the Congressmen to deal in 
real quantities whose measurement was invariable. As a simplifica- 
tion, it was enormously helpful in arranging economic concepts in a 
relevant order. 
In attempting to answer the question of how a nation arrives at an 
optimal resource allocation, the free-traders were led to consider 
four aspects of economic behavior, the first three of which are de- 
rived almost directly from Smith: 
1 )  The division of labor and subsequent exchange of products 
were recognized as the fundamental means of increasing the stock 
of goods available to society. Both tariff advocates and opponents 
agreed that "[it is to mutual advantage] . . . that a man employs a 
neighboring mechanic to make his boots and shoes, instead of 
making them himself. . . ."20 Daniel Webster, in clear reference to 
Smith's example of growing grapes in Scotland, lays out the need 
for a division of labor: 
if the world had but one clime, and but one soil; if all men had the same wants 
and the same means . . . to gratify those wants . . . [then there would be no 
reason for exchange]. But . . . we inhabit a various earth. We have reciprocal 
wants and reciprocal means for gratifying one another's wants. This is the true . 
origin of commerce, . . . an exchange of equivalents.21 
Similarly, the principle of exchange-that both parties gain because 
each receives an article at least as dear to him as that which is given 
up-was distinctly pointed out by Web~ter.2~ In fact, both sides 
were willing to admit the advantages of a division of labor, between 
individuals and between sections of the country; it was generally 
19 While there is no explicit mention of an income flow, it is evident from the 
speeches that the concept of increases in stock approximates a modem flow-of-income 
wealth definition; the stock-flow problem was simply not recognized by the Congress. 
20 Annals, Christopher Rankin ( Miss. ), p. 2019. 
21 Ibid., Daniel Webster ( Mass. ) , p. 2046. 
22 Ibid., p. 2046. 
Congressional Tariff  Debates 
agreed that it was most advantageous for the South to grow cotton, 
the North to produce manufactured goods, and the West to supply 
the nation's foodstuffs. 
I t  was only the free-trade advocates, however, who were willing 
to extend the analysis to an international division of labor which 
could be mutually advantageous: "Commerce between nations has 
the same essential character as commerce between  individual^."^^ 
Or again, "What odds does it make whether the communities are 
separated by Goose Creek or the great At lant i~?"~~ Given the basic 
definition of national wealth mentioned above, we can see that the 
advantages of division of labor and exchange, both internal and 
foreign, were not lost upon the free-traders. The foreign-trade bene- 
fits of "buy where you can buy cheapest" constituted an important 
defense of free trade in these debates. 
2)  Another Smithian tenet accepted wholeheartedly by the tariff 
opponents was that of the "invisible hand" or self-interest as a so- 
cially desirable motivation. In a passage lifted almost directly from 
the Wealth of Nations, P .  P.  Barbour proclaimed: 
there is an instinct implanted in man . . . which . . . impels him to a perpetual 
endeavor to better his conltion; that this principle, acting alike on all, without 
concert, and without even looking to the public interest, every man in society 
is constantly endeavoring to increase his portion of weath, and, consequently, 
every man is laboring to add to the stock of pubIic wealth.25 
Samuel Foot recognized the same idea but linked it directly with 
the question of the tariff: "The greatest degree of national and in- 
dividual wealth is obtained by permitting labor, skill, and capital 
to find their own employment and investment unshackled, and en- 
courage [sic] a free and unrestricted trade."26 The notion that un- 
restricted economic participants pursuing their self-interest reach 
an optimal employment provided a further basis for attacking the 
tariff bill. Several speakers declared that the tariff would divert re- 
sources from their normal occupations, and since the new occupa- 
tions must be less profitable (otherwise resource owners would have 
switched to them voluntarily), a less than optimal solution would 
be 
23 Zbid., Daniel Webster ( Mass. ), p. 2046. 
24 Zbid., Robert Garnett (Va.), p. 2093. 
26 Zbid., P. P. Barbour (Va.), p. 1923. 
26 Zbid., Samuel Foot ( Conn. ), p. 2297. 
27 See for example Zbid., p. 1923 ff. 
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3) Competition was recognized as the force that regulated trade 
and guaranteed the assumption that the national good would result 
from the sum of private self-interest; Christopher Rankin makes this 
position clear: "Capital, if permitted, will always find its place of 
profitable employment. . . . Competition . . . [enables] you to pur- 
chase from those who can produce or manufacture cheapest. . . . 
You are not . . . subjected to the extortion of those from whom you 
have no alternative but to buy at their own  price^."'^ Competition 
on the one hand ensured that prices would be forced down to the 
minimum possible profitable level; on the other hand, competition 
among alternative employers in the labor market was relied on to 
ensure full employment: "If any man were to make his complaint to 
me that he was without employment, I could tell him simply to  go 
to  work. . . a remedy in the reach of e~eryone."~~ 
4)  Production was thought to depend upon a combination of cap- 
ital and labol-?O (and presumably land), the exact combination being 
determined by the skill and industry of the labor component. Given 
this type of production function, the size of the output depended 
on whichever factor was the scare factor-and the Congress clearly 
believed that labor was the scarce factor: "For a century to come, 
the population of our country cannot reach such a state of redun- 
dancy at materially to reduce the [high] rate of wages."31 If one 
wanted to increase production, then, the principal problem would 
be to allocate labor to those employments where the returns to labor 
were greatest. Robert Garnett believed that there were increasing 
returns to labor in agriculture: in contrast to countries lacking an 
equally favorable ratio of labor to "first-class" land, Garnett argued 
that for the United States additional unit labor inputs produced 
more than equal output increases. In manufacturing, on the other 
hand, he felt that at best constant returns were available.32 
The definition of national wealth and these four aspects of eco- 
nomic behavior can be thought of as the basic systemic model of the 
free-traders. Following from the wealth definition, it is entirely in 
28 Ibfd., Christopher Rankin (Miss. ), p. 2005. 
29 Ibid., George McDuffie ( S.C. ), p. 2407. 
30 Ibid., p. 2180. 
31 Ibid., Timothy Fuller (Mass.), p. 1706. An even more explicit statement comes 
from the tariff side: "in this thinly populated country, labor is what we want" 
Ibid., Henry Martindale ( N.Y. ), p. 1643. 
32 Ibid., pp. 1683-84. 
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terms of real goods; prices and money are left out, because they do 
not affect the underlying "real" processes. We see at once that the 
free-traders have developed the essential elements of what is now 
known as the classical model: the amount of production is based on 
the amount of labor input; all markets are cleared, including the 
labor market, by the force of competition; the productivity of labor 
is determined by its employment (the division of labor) and skill 
(the state of technology). 
This model was made dynamic by introducing an historical 
growth pattern. Agriculture is the first stage of production, and 
when it is sufficiently well-established, it provides capital for the 
second stage, foreign commerce. As commerce expands and agricul- 
ture matures, both provide capital resources for manufacturing, the 
third and final stage. Interference in this progression, for example 
by the introduction of a tariff, would divert resources prematurely 
and would result in an insufficient foundation for the most advanced 
stage, thus precipitating fai l~re.5~ 
As is typical of a classical model, this model is an optimistic one: 
if left unfettered, the economy would naturally move to an equilib- 
rium that results in full employment and the optimal product output. 
Christopher Rankin's reply to the problems posed by wartime dis- 
ruption of markets ("time alone restores the equil ibri~m"~~) char- 
acterized the general faith in this view of the economy. 
The model is not complete; it does not develop either a theory of 
distribution or saving, and it leaves implicit how consumer desires 
get translated into production decisions. But when it is recalled that 
the debaters were Congressmen rather than economists, this model 
will be seen to be remarkably appropriate. I t  deals concisely with 
the economic questions raised by the tarriff: it defines national 
wealth, describes how production is organized, and provides a 
framework for analyzing the effects of policy changes on production 
and wealth. I t  is also clear that this type of model is exactly the one 
in which the gains from free trade are the greatest-and therefore 
provides the best justification for opposing the tariff. 
Prices, Money, and Interest. When we introduce the free-trade 
Congressmen's notions of money and prices, the simple model de- 
veloped above begins to lose its innocence; but it remains essentially 
a real-good model. While there was considerable confusion sur- 
33 Ibid., pp. 1935,2253. 
34 Ibid., p. 2020. 
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rounding the monetary system and its relation to prices, it was gen- 
erally held that money and prices merely reflected the underlying 
real processes. There was no "natural price" concept analogous to 
that of Smith or Ricardo. Prices were simply set by the supply and 
demand conditions prevailing in the market. Daniel Webster, for 
example, ascribed high wartime prices to the augmented demand 
caused by unusually high government  expenditure^."^ 
Prices also were seen to depend on the quantity of money in cir- 
culation: "Paper issues of our banks carried the same effect [of en- 
hancing prices] still f~rther.'"~ However, demand was somehow 
independent of either money prices or the amount of money avail- 
able, and reflected only the underlying "real" demand for the 
arti~le.3~ 
The interest rate-properly seen as a return to a factor of pro- 
duction-was taken as an index of the amount of money capital 
available relative to the demand for it. Here it seems there was no 
distinction made between real resources for investment and financial 
resources. The current American interest rate was thought to be 
somewhat higher than the comparable British rate due to the as- 
sumed abundance of British ~apital.3~ 
Because of their fundamental belief in the "real" economic proc- 
esses, the free-trade advocates saw no dangers in international 
pricing or the balance of payments. Specie wodd move in the direc- 
tion of high demand.39 In response to movement of specie, inter- 
national prices would adjust. But since product demand depended 
only on the demand for the article (and not on money prices), there 
would be no output or employment effects resulting from the specie 
m~vernent.~' Consequently, the balance of payments problem was 
"exploded." 
Specific Tarif Arguments. The fragments gathered above into a 
''model)) were of course scattered throughout debates dealing specif- 
ically with the tariff. But now that we have seen what kind of eco- 
nomic conceptions lay behind the tariff arguments, we are in a 
position to understand the nature of those arguments themselves. 
The free-traders contended that a tariff would diminish the na- 
35 Ibid., p. 2031. 
86 Ibid., Daniel Webster (Mass.), p. 2031. 
37 Ibid., p. 2050. 
38 Ibid., p. 1940. 
39 Ibid., p. 2019. 
40 Ibid., p. 2053. 
Con~ressional Tar i f f  Debates 813 
tional wealth by causing future additions to the stock of that wealth 
to be smaller than would be the case in the absence of the tariff. 
The argument was developed along two lines: 
1) The tariff reduces or precludes the benefits derived from an 
international division of labor: "With the labor of ten days, I can 
buy a piece of cloth manufactured in England; whereas, the same 
sort of cloth, manufactured in the United States would cost me 
twelve or thirteen days labor, or a value equivalent to that. These 
are my reasons . . . [for opposing the tariff] ."41 
2)  The tariff, by encouraging a different allocation of resources, 
reduces the total domestic output. In the first instance, a tariff en- 
courages too much capital, i.e., that of the inefficient producer, to 
enter and remain in the Secondly, it coerces resources 
into less profitable uses by taxing the consumers to provide a bounty 
for certain ind~s t r i es .~~  The cost of this resource diversion is pre- 
cisely the opportunity cost-the goods that could be produced if the 
scarce labor had been employed in other  occupation^.^^ 
The tariff opponents refuted both the balance-of-trade argument 
and the employment problem by refusing to admit that they existed. 
An unfavorable balance of trade would cause a change in inter- 
national prices, that is, exchange ratios, which in turn would correct 
the trade imbalance. But this correction would have no iduence on 
domestic employment. Finally, competition was assumed sufEcient 
to keep the wage rate at the full employment level, so there could 
be no legitimate argument for the traiff in terms of correcting do- 
mestic employment patterns. 
The Pro-Tariff Position 
The tariff advocates were not so fortunate as their opponents in 
inheriting a useful conceptual scheme from the contemporary polit- 
ical economists. Their model remained in a cruder state of develop- 
ment, and their arguments tended to be primarily non-economic 
in context. The legislators were familiar with the old mercantilist 
philosophy expounded by Steuart and others, but the mercantilist 
model had been thoroughly discredited intellectually by Smith's 
Wealth of Nations. What emerges as the conceptual framework for 
41 Ibid., Lewis Williams (N.C. ), p. 2111. 
42 Ibid., p. 1925. 
43 Ibid., p. 2086. 
44 Ibid., p. 2062. 
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the pro-tariff position is actually two lines of thought: mercantilist 
economics and, what is more interesting, a modified Keynesian- 
Smithian system. 
We notice first that some of the pro-tariff Congressmen simply 
refused the arguments of Smith. They accepted a definition of 
wealth in terms of precious metals: "To be sure, we get an equiv- 
alent for our money (in trade), and perhaps more, but we consume 
it. . . . England gets our money, and she does not consume it. This 
is the secret of her wealth and of our p~verty.'"~ With such a def- 
inition of wealth, the importance of the favorable balance of trade 
naturally follows: "She [a wise nation] should sell what she can: buy 
only what she must."46 For these mercantilists, then, the question 
of the tariff was essentially one of correcting an imbalance of trade 
through restricting imports. 
The Keynesian-Smithian Framework. The larger portion of the 
tariff advocates accepted the contributions of the Wealth of Nations, 
but made some very surprising modifications that changed the 
policy implications of the model. Smith's definition of wealth in 
terms of the real goods available to society was considered correct. 
Also accepted were the observations about economic behavior, spe- 
cifically the division of labor and self-interest, made by the free- 
traders. However, it was the free-traders' (and Smith's) assumption 
of full employment at equilibrium that was disputed by those sup- 
porting the tariff and that motivated the insightful modification. 
Employment was seen as being directly related to the level of 
production: 
If a farmer has no market for his surplus productions, the supply of his own 
wants will be the measure of his exertions; and if there be no foreign demand 
for the surplus produce of the country, the industry [i.e., employment] of the 
nation will be limited to the supply [i.e., supplying the effective demand] of 
the nation. The want of a market . . . effectually limits the exertions of in- 
dustry.47 
But it was also known that aggregate production could exceed the 
demand ("market") for goods: "[Prosperity or high employment re- 
quires that a society possess] a market for the sale and exchange of 
the surplus of the produce of the labor of its members. This market 
45 Ibid., Henry Martindale (N.Y.), p. 1655. 
46 Ibid., Henry Martindale (N.Y.), p. 1644. 
47 Zbld., Salas Wood (N.Y.), p. 2073. 
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should be competent to the absorption of the entire surplus of pro- 
d ~ c t i o n . " ~ ~  And if the market demand was not great enough, there 
would be unemployment: 
The products of our agricultural labor begin to be limited to the quantity 
necessary for mere subsistence, lest the surplus perish on hand for the want of 
a market at home or abroad. . . . there is a want of employment. How, then, 
can the greatest number of hands be most productively employed? This is the 
problem to be solved.49 
Or, more simply, "Production exceeds consumption, and a portion 
of the people are without occupation, for want of empl~yment.'~ 
Personal consumption clearly depended on income in this model: 
"The farmer was consuming these importations to the extent of his 
ability to purchase. . . . [High war-time income] enabled him to 
sustain, for a time, habits of expense and indulgence to which he 
had not been accu~tomed."~~ Finally, it is clear that the tariff ad- 
vocates did not view involuntary unemployment as a condition of 
temporary disequilibrium: "Permanent excess of production over 
consumption is the only correct criterion [for determining whether 
foreign trade must be developed] ."62 
It was recognized that aside from the private hardships sufFered 
by those who lost income because they were unemployed, there 
were national wealth implications to unemployment as well. Un- 
employed labor was a wasted resource, particularly considering that 
labor was assumed to be the scarce resource, and therefore: "The 
interference of Government to procure employment for the surplus 
population is required to increase the wealth of the nation."* The 
Congress of 1824 was thus led to ask what, in terms of economic 
thought, is a remarkably modern question: "Is full employment pro- 
vided by the nature and distribution of our occupations?"64 Though 
the employment problem is seemingly posed here in structural terms, 
actually it is more one of aggregate demand: with most of the pop- 
48 Ibid., Henry Clay (Ky.), p. 1966. Also: 'Production will exceed the consum - 
tion of the country and new branches of industry will become necessary." Ibii.., 
Salas Wood ( N.Y. ) , p. 2072. 
49 Ibid., James Strong (N.Y.), p. 2127. 
50 Ibid., Salas Wood (N.Y.), p. 2073. 
51 Ibid., Henry Martindale (N.Y.), p. 1634. See also p. 1965 for similar state- 
ments by Henry Clay. 
52 Ibid., Salas Wood (N.Y.), p. 2072. 
53 Ibid., Salas Wood (N.Y.), p. 2074. 
54 Ibid., Henry Martindale ( N.Y. ), p. 1633. 
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ulation engaged in agriculture and supplied with manufactured 
products from Britain, there simply was insufficient "market" or 
"consumption" to keep labor employed. The answer given to the 
rhetorical question above was that there were no markets, that is, 
demand, for the farmers7 products. 
What we see here is a forerunner of an essentially Keynesian 
income-determination model. The Keynesian model is by no means 
described in full, but what is given is central to what was later the 
Keynesian innovation, excluding, of course, the major contribution 
of liquidity preference theory. We can describe a very simple Key- 
nesian model in three equations: 
1) Y = C + I  
2) C = f (Y) 
3) N = @(Y) 
where: Y is income 
C is consumption 
I is investment 
N is employment 
Investment is exogenous, and income, consumption, and employ- 
ment are determined in the model. 
In order to translate the words of the debates into something 
analogous to this Keynesian model, we need to remember: 
1) that we are dealing with a predominantly agricultural economy, 
where investment and consumption were largely in the hands of the 
individual farmers, and distinguishing between the two was impos- 
sible. 
2) that "market" or "consumption" for the Congress meant what 
'6 
aggregate demand" means to the modern economist, including for- 
eign demand and the government sector; for example, on govern- 
ment demand, "[War] compensates the diminished consumption. . . 
by the people, by the extraordinary consumption of the govern- 
ment."65 
3) that "excess production7' was generally the difference between 
the fixed size of the farm crop and that amount neither sold in the 
market nor consumed by the farmer himself; it would be called "un- 
intended farm inventory investment" in modern terms; however, 
there is no reason why it could not include the much less important 
excess industrial production as well. 
Then we can write the model in three equations: 
55 Ibid., George McDufEe ( S.C. ), p. 2406. 
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1) P,+, = C, + C, + Cf where: P,+, is output either sold or consumed 
by  the producer 
2) Cp = f (P,+c) C, is private consumption of domestic- 
ally-produced commodities including 
business consumption (investment) 
3) N = +(PB+c) Cf is exports 
C, is government consumption (any gov- 
ernment GNP purchases) 
N is employment 
Goverment spending and foreign demand58 are exogenous, and outp- 
put sold or consumed by the produced, private consumption, and 
employment are determined in the model. We can add a fourth 
equation to define excess production: 
4) pu = pt - p,+, where: P, is excess production 
Pt is the total actual production (output) 
Now total actual production is exogenous (determined by size of 
crop planted, etc.) and excess production is determined in the 
model. 
We notice immediately that this model is nearly identical with 
the simple Keynesian model described earlier. 
I t  is unquestionably exaggerating the case to formulate fragments 
of various speeches into mathematical or any type of formal model.57 
But such formulation is really not what is at stake-what is impor- 
tant is that in the minds of the tariff advocates there were these 
essentially Keynesian notions: the level of employment related to 
aggregate consumption and equilibrium with involuntary unem- 
ployment. 
I t  is not difficult to see how such sophisticated notions were ar- 
rived at. The United States had been involved in commercial strife 
66 It does not do great injustice to the tariff advocates' position to make exports 
exogenous, since American trade was seen as a small part of total world trade; how- 
ever, to satisfactorily account for their view of both exports and imports, one would 
logically need to introduce the entire monetary sector into the model. Basically, 
specie flow was seen as the regulator forcing nations to purchase abroad only to the 
extent that they sold abroad. However, these views were never systematized. See, 
for example, Zbid., Henry Clay, p. 1962 ff. and Salas Wood, p. 2068 ff. 
57 We must remember that in none of these speeches was there any open attempt 
to create such a model; in this sense, all of the passages from the debates are taken 
out of their contexts. But the purpose of this paper is to go behind (or outside of) 
the context to see what notions the Congress had about the economy. 
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or actual warfare from 1807 until 1815. This period was marked by 
two significant developments: the collapse of foreign trade, partic- 
ularly imports, and greatly increased government expenditures. Yet 
these were also remarkably prosperous years, at least in the minds 
of Congressmen. The return of peace saw large amounts of imports, 
diminished government expenditures (in fact, repayment of the 
debt), and great unemployment. Such conditions were correctly per- 
ceived by several speakers,58 and their observations resulted in the 
model above. 
Other Theoretical Notions. We find little else original in the way 
of further development of the model. Henry Clay advanced the idea 
that the demand for money is in proportion to the amount and activ- 
ity of national wealth (Keynes transactions demand for money?), 
but he tended to confuse money and income, and thus the value of 
his insight was vitiated. He did correctly understand the discrimina- 
tory effects of deflation and inflation on the debtor and creditor 
classes.59 
While the "reaI goods" definition of nationaI wealth was accepted, 
the tariff advocates were somewhat more curious about the origin of 
- 
wealth than their opponents. Their conclusion, if we assume an 
equivalence between Clay's loosely defined "wealth" and Ricardo's 
more precise "value," followed strictly Ricardian lines: "Labor is the 
source of all wealth, but it is not natural labor only; . . . [but also] 
the power of ma~hinery."~~ 
Pro-Tarif Implications and Arguments. As one would expect, an 
analysis based on the Keynesian model outlined above results in 
typically Keynesian policy implications. Full employment becomes 
a policy objective, and therefore: "It is the duty of Government 
to provide employment for all those whom the existing branches 
of industry will not accommodate, and who are idle for want of 
empl~yment."~~ 
Perhaps the most persuasive argument for the tariff, then, relates 
to the aggregate employment benefits to be derived. It was thought 
58 Annals, pp. 2406,2020,1965. 
59 Ibid., p. 1965. 
Ibid., Henry Clay (Ky.), p. 1973. Compare Clay's statement with the following 
by Ricardo (P~inciples of Political Economy and Taxation, London, 1817, Chapter I, 
Section 111): "The exchangeable value of the commodities produced would be in 
proportion to the labor bestowed on their production; not on their immediate pro- 
duction only, but on all those implements or machines required to give to the par- 
ticular labor. . . ." 
81 Annals, Salas Wood (N.Y.), p. 2017. 
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that consumption of domestically-produced articles (C,) would in- 
crease as a result of introducing the tariff; that is, it was expected 
that the function f(Ps+e) would shift. Furthermore, if this shift 
could be purchased at minimal export loss, then employment would 
increase significantly. Nearly every speaker in favor of the bill men- 
tioned employment, and the following is typical: "The object of the 
protecting duty is to give employment to a multitude of persons who 
are now idle."62 
The tariff supporters argued two further points in favor of the 
measure: 
1) Infant industries: Perhaps derived from Sir James Steuart, who 
strongly emphasized this argument, but clearly showing the Hamil- 
tonian influenceYB3 the case for protection of infant industries was 
used nearly as frequently as the employment arguments. It was un- 
derstood that protection should be temporary and involved short-run 
costs; however, when combined with the employment argument, the 
costs were thought to be slight. Currently unemployed American 
resources would become employed, thereby compensating for the 
short-run losses which would result from diminished tradeeB4 
2) Prevention of dumping: As a result of several "auctions" at 
which shiploads of British manufactured goods were sold at very 
slight prices, the tariff advocates urged protection against dumping. 
It was claimed that British manufacturers would: ". . . throw away 
cargoes of their goods, at reduced prices, or at no prices, in order Lo 
break down a growing rival, and indemnify themselves by fleecing 
the whole country afte~wards."~~ 
A Digression on Chapter 23 of The General Theory. J. M. Keynes, 
in his chapter entitled "Notes on Mercantilism", in The General 
Theory, notes that there can be two employment-stimulating effects 
of a favorable balance of trade: the direct effect of increasing aggre- 
gate demand through foreign investment, and the indirect effect of 
reducing the domestic interest rate, which stimulates domestic in- 
vestment and increases effective demand. He then searches the 
mercantilist literature to discover whether or not these effects were 
62 Ibid., John Wright (Ohio), p. 1502. See also pp. 1964, 1642, ,2407. 
63 See Hamilton's Report on Manufactures of December 5, 1791 (reprinted in 
McKee, Samuel Jr., ed., Papers on Public Credit, Commerce, and Finance by Alex- 
ander Hamilton; New York: Columbia University Press, 1934); especially pages 
203-206. 
Annals, pp. 1472,1553,1990,2071,2263. 
66 Ibid., John Tod (Pa. ) , p. 1473. 
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known to those who proposed protective tariffs; he concludes that 
both effects were recognized, but that "The mercantilists perceived 
the existence of the problem without being able to push their anal- 
ysis to the point of solving it."66 
Whether or not they can be described as "mercantilists," the tariff 
advocates of 1824 were not only aware of the employment implica- 
tions, they in fact devised a theoretical framework that could explain 
it. Their confusion concerning the role of money prevented them 
from having any idea of the indirect effect, but their conception of 
the direct stimulus of import restriction was nearly complete. Euro- 
pean markets were shut to American agricultural products, with the 
exception of cotton and tobacco, and the American market was 
flooded with foreign manufactured goods. Given this structural 
arrangement, it appeared that a tariff that would prohibit or greatly 
reduce the flow of imports must of necessity dramatically-and 
favorably-change the balance of trade, even after allowing for 
potential retaliation; if one is buying but not selling abroad, retalia- 
tion is irrelevant. These mercantilists expected the employment 
benefits to be great. 
The pro-tariff position, then, was significant in that it refuted the 
prevailing economic doctrine on intellectual grounds; its proponents 
refused to be content with commonplace statements that the clas- 
sical doctrine was fine in theory but did not work out in practice. In- 
stead, they proclaimed that on the employment question the classical 
doctrine was wrong theoretically-a claim which was not recognized 
by the economists until a century later. 
Quasi-Economic Arguments. There were also a series of quasi- 
economic arguments used on each side, the principal ones relating to 
the preservation of national sovereignty through economic indepen- 
dence, the development of a "balanced" economy to foster national 
unity, the need for federal revenue, and national defense require- 
ments. We need only be concerned here with those arguments that 
were recognized by the free-trade economists as valid. 
Adam Smith admitted four cases for which tariffs could legit- 
imately be established: 
66 J. M. Keynes, The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money (New 
York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1936) Chapter 23, section IV. J. A. Schumpeter, in 
History of Economic Analysis, gives a somewhat fuller description of mercantilist 
thought on the employment problem; he concludes that ':jsome of the mercantilist 
writers went to surprising, in fact to Keynesian, lengths. (p. 350). The present 
case seems a good example of that. 
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1) to protect defense industries, 
2)  to offset domestic excise taxes, 
3) to retaliate against foreign tariffs before negotiation, 
4) to introduce free-trade gradually. 
Of these four cases, only the first is frequently discussed in the de- 
bates. There existed slight excises on "alcoholic spirits," but since the 
duty proposed was considerably higher than the excise, the second 
argument was not used. The third case was mentioned briefly, but 
it was assumed that Britain's policy was inflexible and therefore this 
argument was inappropriate. The 1816 debates were concerned with 
the fourth case, the need for adjustment, but by 1824 de facto free 
trade had existed for nine years-the duties imposed in 1816 being 
wholly inadequate to slow the flow of imports. 
It would seem that since the free-traders placed such great store 
in Adam Smith, the tariff advocates would have used his arguments 
for trade restriction to undercut the free-trade position. From what 
we know of the Congress's familiarity with The Wealth of Nations, 
we can be fairly sure that these cases of "legitimate7' trade restriction 
were known. One can only speculate as to the tactics involved which 
avoided these defenses of the bill. 
The years 1824 and 1894 can be seen as polar opposites in the 
evolution of American tariff policy. In 1824 the commercial condi- 
tion was one of virtual free-trade, but a majority of the newly-elected 
Congress was pledged to institute a systematic policy of protection. 
In 1894, the country had experienced thirty uninterrupted years of 
increasing protection and high tariffs, culminating in the high 
McKinley Tariff of 1890. In 1892, however, the Democratic Party 
had been swept into complete control of the national government 
on a specific platform of "tariff for revenue only." The Congressional 
debates in both 1824 and 1894 were exceptional since in both cases 
the basic issue was protection versus free-trade rather than the more 
limited question of t a r8  revision. 
A few general comments about the 1894 debates are in order be- 
fore we turn to the specific arguments advanced by each side. The 
debate monopolized House business for most of January, 1894, re- 
quiring over two thousand pages in the Congressional Record to 
report it. Regional differences, i.e., the free-trade South and Border 
States opposing the manufacturing North, made some impact on the 
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final vote,"7 but in the end strict party voting prevailed: the Dem- 
ocrats voted in favor of the bill 193 to 15, the People's Party in favor 
9 to 1, and the Republicans against the bill 123 to 0.68 
Concerning the substance of the debates themselves, we readily 
detect from reading these debates that a considerable body of eco- 
nomic doctrine existed which was popularly accepted and which 
therefore belonged to the "public domain." Simplistic notions of sup- 
ply and demand, division of production into wages and profits, and 
competition were common to most members of the Congress. How- 
ever, in contrast to the 1824 debates, the later debates made little 
explicit use of the writings of professional economists. David Hume, 
Adam Smith, and J. S. Mill were mentioned, but only perfunctorily. 
Alfred Marshall, Frank Taussig, and J. B. Clark, all of whom were 
contemporaries and had published important works prior to 1894 
which were relevant to the tariff issue, were apparently not known 
and their works did not play any major role in the debates. What- 
ever influence economics authors had must have come through the 
writings of much more contemporary and policy-oriented authors 
such as Richard Cobden,B9 Edward Atkinsonyo and Edward Stan- 
But in general, the debates do not give evidence of the 
Congressmen having much familiarity with the works of professional 
economists. 
Also in contrast to the situation in 1824, in 1894 a vast amount of 
statistics was available from the census. The ubiquitous citations of 
long series of data reveal more about the Congressmen than about 
the economy: the speakers had no conceptual means to organize the 
data, and beyond computing averages, had no techniques to deal 
with them. Obvious problems were encountered in attempting to 
decipher the effects of price changes, drawing international com- 
parisons from different bases, and dealing with the distinction be- 
tween trends and other types of variation. The lack of a theoretical 
framework, however, was a more serious limitation, rendering mean- 
ingless attempts to use empirical evidence. The overwhelming difEi- 
67 That, for example, is how the Democratic votes against the bill can be ex- 
plained. 
68 The vote is reported in Record, p. 1994. Congressmen can be identified by 
party in the Joint Committee on Printing, U.S. Congress, Oficial Congressional 
Directoy, Fifty-Third Congress, Second Session (Washington, 1894). 
69 Record, p. 711. 
70 Zbid., p. 802. 
71 Zbid., p. 805. 
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culty was simply an inability to separate theoretically significant 
data from the rest. The appeal to "consult the facts" was, of course, 
irresistible; unfortunately, it was rarely meaningful or decisive. 
The 1894 debates only peripherally touched on the aggregate 
problems of employment, output, and growth. While there was con- 
siderable discussion of such concepts as labor and the "nation's in- 
d ~ s t r y , " ~ ~  it is clear from the language that the primary perspective 
was that of micro-analysis, a perspective that looked to the indi- 
vidual firm or entrepreneur for economic laws that could be applied 
to the entire nation.73 The lack of an aggregate perspective can 
probably be traced to two influences: 1 )  the nation had enjoyed a 
relatively long period of prosperity and growth, during which mass 
unemployment and other macro-problems were perceived as short- 
lived; 2) the development of professional economics, aside from 
Marx, tended to focus on micro-analysis, and so at least there was 
no pressure from this quarter to consider macro aspects. 
A more difficult problem was that of separating the effects of 
tariff changes on the workingman qua wage-earner from the effects 
on the workingman qua consumer. Clearly the Democrats, and to a 
lesser extent the Republicans, took as their goal bettering the work- 
ingman's standard of living. Yet with few notions of the relevant 
price, income, and wealth magnitudes involved, differential analysis 
of the impact of various tariff policies was almost impossible. 
Finally, the Fifty-Third Congress found it difficult to separate the 
effects of thirty years of protection policy from other economic de- 
velopments during this period. Wages, profits, output, and wealth 
had grown tremendously in these thirty years. The only free-trade 
basis for comparison was the pre-Civil War period, clearIy not very 
valuable for judging tariff policy in the 1890's. 
With this understanding of some of the background and general 
problems involved, let us turn to the specific models posited by the 
two party groups. 
Republican Confusion 
When we turn to a systematic study of the protectionist position, 
we find that the Republicans presented a curious model, seemingly 
profound but at bottom an almost classic case of economic nonsense. 
The usual argument made for a protective tars-an argument gen- 
72 Zbid., Charles Be11 (Texas), p. 551. 
73 Zbid., W. B. Cockran ( N.Y. ) , Appendix, p. 18. 
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erally conceded to have theoretical justification-is that the dynamic 
gains from protection may outweigh the static gains from free trade. 
But this was not the argument presented, and we can easily see why 
it was ignored. First, American industry, and certainly those specific 
industries that claimed protection, could in no way be described in 
1894 as "infants;" the case for industrialization through infant indus- 
tries tariff protection was not viable. Second, what we might call 
Keynesian employment problems were thought to be random and 
temporary, a sentiment bolstered by the recent history of presumed 
high employment and growth. Also, defense was not a major con- 
cern. America had not been at war with a foreign power in almost 
fifty years, and, anyway, defense technology did not at that time re- 
quire highly specialized industries. The more esoteric argument of 
bettering the terms of trade was not raised simply because it was not 
perceived. And finally, the argument that protection was needed to 
encourage diversity of industry, thereby avoiding the problems of 
instability due to narrow product specialization, was never made; 
for obvious reasons, the American economy was already highly 
diversified. 
The Trade Model. What the Republicans did present as their 
model is a mixture of confused insight and common misconception. 
At the base of the model is a labor theory of value: "The single and 
only source of wealth is labor."74 All goods produced, including 
capital, are the products of labor and can be costed at their labor- 
input values: ". . . capital is nothing more or less than labor in an- 
other form or state; it follows that it must have cost in proportion to 
the price of labor that produced it. . . ."76 The real cost to society 
of any production, then, is simply the labor that directly or indirectly 
went into that production process. The Republicans drew the usual 
conclusions from this first premise, for example, that labor-saving 
inventions increase wealth.78 
When the Republicans turned to the question of trade, the only 
basis they admitted of was that of absolute cost advantage: "It 
would be impossible to bring imports from the other side [of the 
Atlantic] here . . . if it were not for the fact that these articles are 
produced upon a cheaper scale in the Old World. . . However, 
74 Zbid., John Dalzell (Pa.), p. 652. All of the quotations in this section are taken 
from speeches by Republican Congressmen. 
75 Ibid., M ron Wright (Pa.), p. 811. 
78 See I b d  p. 771. 
77 Zbid., Charles Daniels (N.Y. ), p. 779. 
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the Republicans did agree that if the imported goods were produced 
cheaper abroad than here, then they should be imported: "No pro- 
tectionist holds that the protective policy should be applied to any 
industry which must be carried on here under natural disadvantages, 
that is, where a larger amount of labor is permanently required 
to make or produce a given article here than is required else- 
where. . . ."78 That is, national wealth would be increased if the 
imported goods cost less in labor than the same goods would have 
cost if they had been produced at home. 
Starting from this view of the proper role for trade, the Repub- 
licans were led to their justification, indeed theoretical imperative, 
for tariff intervention by their unique system of calculating labor 
costs. Real production costs to a society are, they maintained, the 
direct and indirect labor costs of that production; and it is these 
costs which form the only legitimate basis for trade, as Dingley's 
statement above makes clear. I t  is only when labor costs, in terms of 
real labor inputs, are lower abroad than here that trade will increase 
the wealth of the country. These labor inputs are determined by the 
technological conditions, that is, the state of knowledge and the re- 
source endowment. But trade naturally is carried on in money 
values, not labor values, and in fact the only ultimate cost com- 
ponent, the price of labor, is set by supply a id  demand conditions 
in the labor market: ". . . wages are made [i.e. determined] by sup- 
ply and demand if all the elements affecting supply and demand are 
taken into con~ideration."~~ To the Republicans, these "supply and 
demand conditions" relate principally to relative scarcity, somewhat 
to institutional arrangements, but not at all to labor prod~ctivi ty.~~ 
The problem, then, is that there may be divergence between money 
labor costs and real labor costs, with the market catering to money 
costs but gains-from-trade considerations depending on real labor 
costs: "The money prices of domestic products are determined by 
the cost of production, . . . and when they cost more in money than 
abroad it is simply because labor receives higher wages."s1 In other 
words, the natural trade advantage, that is, lower real labor cost, 
might not coincide with lower money costs. The Republicans argued 
that in fact for most goods real labor costs were the same or lowers2 
78 Ibid., Nelson Dingley (Maine), p. 731. 
79 Ibid., Nelson Din le (Maine), p. 733. 
See for example i % i h  pp. 731,788, 638. 
81 Ibid., Nelson Dingley (Maine), p. 730. 
82 For any individual good, the American (real) labor cost might be lower, higher, 
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in America than abroad, but that money labor costs were higher 
than abroad. Therefore, in the free market, the United States would 
import goods that could be made with less real labor input here than 
abroad but higher money cost, and this importation would codict 
with the Republican absolute-advantage theory of how wealth was 
increased through trade. Protection, then, was needed to cover the 
disparity between money and actual labor cost comparisons. The 
market would thus be led to a "correct" solution, in which the proper 
goods would be traded in the proper amounts in order to maximize 
the gains from trade. 
The essentials of this model can be seen schematically, but with 
some loss of information, as follows: 
let subscripts refer to United States (a)  and rest of world (w) 
define RC = "real" (labor) costs of production 
MC = "money" costs of production 
then: 
( 1)  RC, = f [(technology) ,; (resources) ,] 
(2)  RCw = f [(technology) W; (resources) ,] 
and: 
(3)  Real Gains from Trade = f [RC,; RC,] 
J. , 
(3a) Real Gains from Trade = f 
also : 
(4 )  MC, = f [(supply of labor) .; (demand for labor) .] 
( 5 )  MCw = f [(supply of labor) W; (demand for labor) ,] 
and: 
(6)  Market Trade = f [(MC,; MCw)] 
or specifically: 
- 
MCW (6a) Market Trade = f [rn] 
The Republican theory of the size of the tariff was expressed in 
the Republican platform of 1892 and quoted by Rep. Dalzell: ". . . 
that on all importations coming into competition with the products 
of American labor there should be duties levied equal to the differ- 
or the same as labor costs abroad, depending on the relevant technology and re- 
sources; and this relationship should determine whether the good gets traded or 
not However, taking all oods, general roductivity differentials favorable to Amer- 
i- labor wme explicitly kied;  See I&, pp. 895,731,788,658. 
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ence between wages abroad and at home."83 Or again, a tariff should 
be: ". . . a duty which covers the difference of money cost of pro- 
duction and distribution here and abroad of an article which can be 
produced or made here substantially to the extent of our wants with- 
out natural di~advantage."~~ 
Expressing in more generalized and symmetric but mathemat- 
ically equivalent form, we can write: 
RCw MCw (7) taritf=[=--1 MC, [MC~I  
or: 
RCW ""-1 = [-I (7a) [g + RC, 
when this tariff is imposed, equation (6a) changes to: 
(8)  Market Trade = f [MCLV+~ar8] 
and substituting (7a) into (8)  : 
(9) Market Trade=f [%I 
thus forcing the market to be dependent on the same variables as 
equation (3) depends on. 
We can see quickly the working of this model from a simple ex- 
ample. Suppose that real labor costs were RCw = 3 and RCa = 2; 
then, according to Republican theory, we should want this good 
priced at a 3:2 ratio. However, suppose that MCw = 2 and MCa = 4. 
This is precisely the case that the Republicans claimed obtained in 
most markets: the actual cost of the American good was as low or 
lower than that of the foreign good, but the money price, pushed up 
by high wages and a high standard of living, was higher. Then a 
tariff would be imposed (equation 7) : 
MCw] [MCa] = [3 - 21 4 = 4 tariff = [:% - -
MCa 2 4 
then the goods would compete in the market at the price ratio of 
MCw + tariff : MCa or 2 + 4:4 = 6:4, precisely the ratio of RCw:RCa. 
8s Ibid., John Dalzell (Pa.), p. 651. 
M Ibld., Nelson Dingley ( Maine), p. 727. 
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It is clear now that the logic of this model (in either its descriptive 
or schematic form) brings us to an inevitable conclusion: given the 
institutional environment posited by the Republicans, a tariff was 
essential for protecting and augmenting American wealth. 
fur the^ Points About the  Model. The Republicans attempted to 
document their case by measuring money labor costs according to 
weekly wages, not as a cost per unit of output: 
The proprietor of one of these English shops told me that his pay roll averaged 
a pound ($4.86) per employee per week. The average [American] pay roll . . . 
was last year $2 per day or $12 per week; and these two shops are probably 
fair averages of those on corresponding work in the two countries. I will not 
dwell on this point, as this difference in wages is not now disputed. . . .85 
It must be noted here that if as claimed there were no productivity 
differentials between countries, and if the work week was of the 
same length, then weekly wages are indeed an appropriate measure 
of labor costs. These observations led the Republicans to typical 
"pauper-labor" conclusions, including a declaration that free-trade 
is unfair: "Give the American manufacturer foreign wages and he 
will fear no c~mpetition."~~ And in the absence of a tariff, American 
wages would necessarily decline: ". . . But [free trade] . . . in- 
volves a reduction of wages to the level of Spanish and Cuban 
labor. . . ."87 
As a slight digression from the development of this model, we 
might pause here to consider one of the implications of what has 
already been said. If we accept the claim that there were no produc- 
tivity differentials between European and American labor, then 
the higher American wages must have resulted from one of two 
situations : 
1) American labor was paid more than its marginal product; that 
is, capital was receiving less than its marginal product. However, 
the Republicans were clearly not sacrificing the returns to producers 
in order to achieve higher real wages for labor: 
There is no difference of interest between classes on this question. [The tariff] 
is either better or worse for all classes; . . . it is a necessity of the case, if 
[factories] do run, that there shall be a profit in running them, equal at least 
to the average profit of other business in the country.88 
85 Ibid., William Draper ( Mass. ) , p. 802. 
86 Ibid., William Draper ( Mass. ), p. 805. 
87 Ibid., Julius Burrows ( Mich. ), p. 577. 
88 IMd., William Draper (Mass.), p. 802. 
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2 )  Alternatively, foreign labor was paid less than its marginal 
product, and foreign capital more than its marginal product. But the 
Republicans likewise rejected this situation, by accepting the notion 
that foreign producers also received less than their marginal prod- 
uct: "Free trade discourages production among our own people be- 
cause the foreign producer can live cheaper, and work cheaper, and 
sell cheaper. . . ."89 Why both foreign labor and capital should be 
so perverse as permanently to accept lower returns than their mar- 
ginal products is, of course, never explained. 
The protectionists' insistence on absolute advantage as the only 
basis for trade led them to a narrow view of the adjustments that 
would follow the opening of freer trade. In the first instance, they 
were unable or refused to see that while some industries would 
necessarily decline, others might grow: "One industry after another 
would be destroyed by this low-priced labor abroad, and pauperism 
would be increased in Arneri~a."~~ Secondly, they feared that there 
were not enough industries with an absolute advantage over foreign 
competitors to keep the labor force employed: "We have no advan- 
tageous industries which can employ all our labor in the production 
of commodities whose excess over and above our own consumption 
can find a market elsewhere. . . . "91 
The Republican model is easily recognized as a somewhat refined 
combination of the "pauper labor" and "scientific tariff" arguments.02 
Its basic fallacy, of course, lies in its confusion between real costs 
and values and money costs and valuesQ3 It  is clear from the model 
that one cannot consistently maintain that both real wages and real 
profits are higher in the U.S. than abroad and also maintain that 
there are not productivity differentials as well; one cannot cut the 
same pie into larger pieces for everyone. But this inconsistency 
emerges only from the model, and in fact is seen only by lifting the 
model from its massive rhetorical context. 
From the limited scope of this study's data, it is not possible to 
tell how much of the model was believed and how much was dic- 
tated by political necessity; but if we choose to trust their sincerity, 
89 Ibid., Binger Hermann (Iowa), Appendix, p. 508. 
Ibid., Albert Hopkins (Pa.), p. 638. 
91 Ibid., Mamott Brosius (Pa.), p. 746. See also p. 607. 
92 p. T. Ellsworth, The Intemtioml Economy, 3rd Edition. (New York: The 
Macmillan Company ), 1964, pp. 227-230. 
93 This is a confusion that the Congress of 1824 avoided by refusing to discuss 
money variables; it documents the argument made above that consideration only of 
real values was a tremendous and important simplification for that Congress. 
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the Republicans in Congress demonstrated little understanding of 
the economic process. 
Democratic Innocence 
The Basic Tarif-Reform Model. When we turn to the Democratic 
position, we find that the tariff-reformers were as ambitious in their 
schema and as naive in their observations as the Republicans. The 
Democratic majority in Congress took as its principal tariff-reform 
goal the raising of real wages paid to labor. The tariff bill of 1894 
proposed to achieve this rise in real wages by focusing "reform" in 
two areas: first, it put raw wool, iron ore, coal, and lumber, all raw 
materials, on the duty-free list; second, it reduced the duty on such 
items as refined sugar and steel, which were produced domestically 
under trusts or combines. 
Precisely how cheaper raw materials would get translated into 
higher real returns to labor is explained by the tariff-reform model. 
In the opening speech of the debate, William Wilson laid out the 
basic position: 
[The workingman's] wages depend on the products of his labor. Whatever 
goes as a tax into the material he uses is a diminution of the wages of the 
laboring man. As you cheapen his materials, . . . you enable him to put his 
finished products on the market at prices that wilI rapidly and indefinitely in- 
crease [his wagesl.04 
The fundamental proposition for the model that emerges from 
Wilson's statement is the two-fold relationship of wages: wages vary 
directly with the value of output and inversely with the price of 
other variable inputs. 
The second feature of the model is most clearly explained a little 
later in the debate: 
If . . . the supply should exceed the demand [for any good], competition 
amongst the owners of the commodity would cause the price to decline until 
they could only obtain the cost of their possessions and a reasonable compensa- 
tion for the use of their capital invested and for their personal services.05 
The proposal stated here is simply that in a competitive system ex- 
cess profits should be zero: the return to capital is "a reasonable 
94 Record, William Wilson (W. Va.), Appendix, p. 196. All of the quotations in 
this section are taken from speeches by Democratic Congressmen. 
95 Ibid., Charles Bell (Texas), p. 550. 
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compensation," in addition to which the entrepreneur receives pay- 
ment for his managerial services. 
The third condition, needed to make this model viable, is that real 
inputs are somehow directly related to real output, in some sense a 
production function; phrasing the connection rhetorically, W. B. 
Cockran asks: "Is it axiomatic in political economy that the capacity 
of an individual to employ labor bears a fixed relation to the amount 
of capital at his disposal? And is the same rule applicable to nations 
that applies to  individual^?"^^ Later he answers his own question: 
"[When you diminish] production you diminish the amount of labor 
and the quantity of materials employed in produ~tion."~~ 
The fourth point is also contained in the portion of Cockran's 
speech quoted above: the model is essentially a micro-economic 
picture of a firm generalized to the entire economy. The "generaliza- 
tion" process is a simple carry-over, in which conclusions about parts 
are expected to hold for the whole; the methodology proceeds on the 
assumption that the "rule applicable to nations" is derived from 
observing individuals. 
We are now in a position to gather the above elements into a 
model, along with certain simple definitions, and view the system 
critically. Profits, including return to capital, are simply the differ- 
ence between total revenue and total operating costs: 
(1) r = T R - T O C  where: . ~ r  = profits 
TR = total revenue 
TOC = total operating costs 
Total revenue is output price times quantity: 
(2) T R = P o * Q  Po = output price 
Q = output quantity 
Total operating cost is composed of labor cost plus the cost of raw 
materials : 
(3) TOC = wL + P,M w =wage rate 
L = labor 
P, = price of raw materials 
M = raw materials 
These simple definitions were part of the "public domain" of eco- 
nomic knowledge and are thoroughly documented in the debates. 
Substituting (3 )  and (2) into (1)  gives us: 
96 Zbid., W. B. Cockran (N.Y.), Appendix, p. 16. 
97 Ibid., W. B. Cockran (N.Y.), Appendix, p. 17. 
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Equation (4)  is an exceedingly short summary of the basic model, 
but given two assumptions it reflects the tariff-reform thinking re- 
markably well. The first assumption is that under conditions of com- 
petition profits are constant; that is, we assume T is fixed at the level 
of "reasonable compen~ation."~~ Secondly, based on their recent ex- 
perience of having the labor force nearly at full employment for a 
considerable period, the Democrats assumed that the effective labor 
force could not be expanded much in the short-run; that is, the labor 
supply was believed highly inelastic above the contemporary em- 
ployment level. 
Let us now examine the effects of the tariff bill in terms of equa- 
tion (4).  The first part of the bill reduced the tariff on, and there- 
fore the prices, P,, of raw materials. If P, declined and .lr remained 
constant (by the competition assumption), then qualitatively there 
are five possible adjustments simply to  balance the equation: 
1) M could increase; 
2)  L could increase; 
3)  w could increase; 
4)  Q could decrease; 
5)  Po could decrease. 
We remember that Q, L, and M are related in fixed proportions. 
Thus if adjustments (1) or (2)  occur, both must occur and Q must 
necessarily increase also. But L is assumed fixed upwards at full 
employment, and thus (1) and (2) cannot occur.99 
The possibility of adjustment (4)  is likewise excluded, since com- 
petition would not permit reduced production in the face of reduced 
input prices. M and L would also have to decrease, by the fixed pro- 
portions argument, further reducing input prices. 
Finally, w could increase (adjustment 3 )  or Po could decrease 
(adjustment 5) ;  either one of these or some combination of both 
would be possible, each being a single adjustment having no wider 
repercussions in the equation and each capable of exactly offsetting 
the decline in prices of raw materials. These adjustments were pre- 
cisely those which the tariff-reformers expected, because each also 
98 This dubious assumption is investigated more fully below. 
99 Certainly if there were unemployed labor resources, adjustment (2) would 
be beneficial; in fact, it was recognized as a possibility: "If production be unre- 
stricted by law we believe trade [i.e., production] will increase so that the demand 
for labor in this country will exceed the supply . . . and the result of the competition 
will be to raise his wages and improve his candition. . . ." Record, W. B. Cockran 
( N.Y. ), Appendix, p. 18. 
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would raise the real wages of labor. The following statement, ex- 
pressed in negative form, accurately reflects the expectation of (3)  
and (5): 
Under [the tariff system], which increases the cost of the goods, or rather the 
selling value of the goods made by the protected manufacturer, you diminish 
the purchasing power of the wages of the laborer while . . . you have already 
reduced the compensation he receives for his labor.100 
The second part of the tariff bill aimed to reduce the duties on 
those goods produced domestically under trust or combine arrange- 
ment. Again with reference to equation (4)  : ". . . protection enables 
manufacturers to obtain better prices for their products. . . ."lol By 
restricting competition, the trusts were able to raise profits above the 
"reasonable compensation" level; that is, the increase in Po due to 
the tar& was met by a rise in r: "Active foreign competition being 
shut out by a high protective tariff. . . . [the trusts] kill competition, 
arrange prices to suit themselves, and regulate production according 
to demands at their high extortionate price."lo2 Thus in practical 
terms the workingman was simply faced with higher prices, hence 
lower real wages. So by reducing duties on these consumer goods, 
real wages were likewise raised. 
Equation (4)  and its accompanying behavioral assumptions repre- 
sent the brief essentials of the Democratic vision of the economic 
system. At the least it was a plausible attempt rationally to reconcile 
the goals of tariff reform with the specific tariff reform chosen. 
Shortcomings in the Model. To the modem economist-indeed, to 
the economist of 1894--the model depicted in equation (4) appears 
extremely nalve. The arguments based on it represent a good ex- 
ample of theoretically valid policy conclusions resulting from under- 
lying theoretical confusion. There is first the failure to take account 
of Keynesian problems: the levels of national output, employment, 
and prices are really not considered in the aggregate. However, more 
serious shortcomings arise in attempting, as the reformers did, to 
use the model as an accurate micro-analytic description. There are 
at least five theoretical problems that arouse suspicion as to the 
validity of the model, even in its limited micro application: 
1) The most obvious is that there is no reason for profit levels to 
100 Ibid., Michael Harter (N .Y . ) ,  p. 740. 
101 Ibid., Charles Bell (Texas), . 550. 
102 i b d ,  William Breckinridge PKy. ), p. 716. 
834 Richard C. Edwards 
remain constant as opposed to profit rates being equal. Competition 
will insure that "excess7' profits are zero in equilibrium, but this only 
insures that rates of profits between industries be equal, not that 
overall profits somehow remain fixed. Once we release T to vary, 
then, there is no assurance that declining materials prices will get 
translated into higher real wages. Even in a completely static econ- 
omy, changing relative prices will not in general leave aggregate 
profits constant. In fact, it was known that the capital stock was 
growing: "Capital increases from year to year in any country by the 
amount of its product that is saved from consumption."103 The ques- 
tion becomes much more complicated when there is positive net 
investment and total income is rising. However, so long as the reduc- 
tion in tariffs does not call forth such a large increase in profits as 
actually to reduce real wages, then the constant profits assumption 
can be relaxed without serious damage to the model. 
2) The model completely disregards capital. Certainly various 
tariff policies would have differential effects on the application of 
and returns to capital, yet these problems are never explored. The 
notion of constant variable-input-output relations (i.e., fixed co- 
efficients between variable inputs and output) does not appear to be 
a significant limitation, since the possibility of substituting capital 
for labor was recognized. However, leaving capital out of consider- 
ation restricts the applicability of such concepts as substitution of 
inputs. 
3) "Raw materials7' is a difficult concept to define in terms of a 
modern industrial economy. The Republicans forcefully pointed out 
that materials inputs to one firm are simply outputs to another-and 
this problem becomes increasingly complex as the number of pro- 
duction stages between initial producer and ultimate consumer in- 
creases, as obtains with industrial progress. The total effect, then, on 
real wages is no longer unambiguous: for example, if the price of raw 
wool declines, and assuming that this decline gets translated into a 
decline in the price of woolen goods, then the real wages of woolens 
consumers go up but those of workers in the production of raw wool 
may go down. Without some concept of magnitudes, it is not clear 
what has happened to real returns to labor. 
4)  The tariff reform model leaves out of consideration the critical 
problem of whether labor was a relatively scarce or abundant factor. 
la Ibid., W. B. Cockran (N.Y.), Appendix, p. 18. 
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The effects of tariff changes on relative income shares cannot be de- 
termined in ignorance of the relative scarcity. 
5) Comment (4)  refers to division of a fixed income, but there 
is also the problem of effects on growth of income, which the model 
likewise ignores. 
The Sophisticated Free-Trade Position. In addition to the na'ive 
tariff-reform model presented above, the more militant free-traders 
posited relatively more sophisticated notions; in fact, their version 
approximated the economist's classical comparative-cost trade 
model. Charles Bell put forth the essential postulate of this theory: 
. . . in fact the more they [people] trade the richer they get if each receives 
from the other something he needs which it would have taken him longer to 
produce than it did to produce the article he parted with for it. When people 
are not hampered by restrictive legislation, . . . experience soon demonstrates 
where the various necessities or luxuries of life can be produced with the least 
expenditure of labor, and they adapt themselves to the conditions prescribed 
by the laws of nature.104 
The importance of the above statement is that Bell compares the 
real cost of a desired imported article to the real cost of the exported 
good for which it is traded, rather than to the cost of the desired 
article if produced at home. The latter comparison is, of course, the 
absolute-advantage case, which was recognized as well; as usual, it 
evoked the typical plagiarism of Smith's "hothouses in Scotland" 
argument.lo5 But Bell makes the much stronger statement of com- 
parative advantage, exposing consumption possibilities based on a 
trading line. This was a significant advance over the Republicans' 
previous recognition of only the absolute-advantage case, which, as 
we saw, led them to fear "pauper" labor. 
To complete our survey of the free-trade assumptions, we need to 
introduce three further strands of thought: 
1) There was a clear understanding of the difference between 
weekly wages paid to labor and labor cost per unit of output: "It is 
undoubtedly a fact that laborers of all kinds received better compen- 
sation in this country than elsewhere, if we estimate it in money by 
the week; but if we estimate their compensation by the results 
accomplished, then such is not the case."lo6 Or again, ". . . invention 
renders labor so efficient that we can maintain the rate of wages, that 
104 Ibid., Charles Bell (Texas), p. 555. 
106 Ibid., p. 555. 
106 Ibid., Charles Bell (Texas), p. 550. 
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we can shorten the hours of toil and still cheapen production."lo7 
This distinction, so obvious to economists as to be hardly worth not- 
ing, is crucial to any clear view of the relevant economic processes; 
yet this distinction was not admitted by the Republicans. 
Further, it was seen that high real wages were possible because of 
the high productivity of the American worker: "The higher the skill, 
the higher the intelligence; the higher the capacity, necessarily the 
higher the wage. . . ."lo8 
2) The Democrats understood the static argument that lower real 
domestic production resulted from tariff restriction, and that this 
decline inproduction occurred precisely because the tariff acted as 
a subsidy to inefficient industries. Both inefficient firms in an other- 
wise efficient industry and entirely inefficient industries, in terms of 
international comparisons, would be subsidized by a tariff: "[the 
tariff] encourages men to engage in trades that they cannot carry on 
in equal competition. . . ."109 Finally, the cost of supporting ineffi- 
cient industries was seen as precisely those goods which were fore- 
gone in the production of goods which were produced.l1° 
3) There was an implicit recognition of the terms-of-trade prob- 
lem, although the influence of a tariff on the terms of trade was skill- 
fully avoided. But in the case of expert bounties granted by the 
German and Austrian governments to their sugar exporters, and 
against vehement Republican claims of unfair competition, the free- 
traders argued that ". . . if Germany is fool enough to spend money 
to give our people cheap sugar, . . . let her do it. . . . "1 11 
SOME CONCLUSIONS ABOUT CONGRESSIONAL KNOWLEDGE AND THE NATURE 
OF CONGRESSIONAL DEBATE 
In concluding, we must note first the inescapable impression that 
both sides in the 1824 debates showed themselves extremely knowl- 
edgeable-they knew what the political economists were saying and 
they were clever in making original observations about the economy. 
While generally confused about money and prices, the Congressmen 
were nevertheless clear on the problems of resource allocation, in- 
come and employment levels, thk gains from trade, and growth. 
The Congress of 1824 refused to accept as applicable to a national 
107 Ibid., W. B. Cockran (N.Y.), Appendix, p. 14. 
108 Ibid., William Breckinridge (Ky.) ,  p. 711. 
109 Ibid., W. B. Cockran (N.Y.), Appendix, p. 16. See also pp. 740,659. 
110 Ibid., p. 740. 
111 Ibid., John Warner (N.Y.), p. 660. 
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economy those common-sensical postulates on which a good business 
is managed. In some cases they came up with wrong notions, but 
they did produce important insights relevant to an economic system. 
Less concretely, there was in the 1824 debates a tone of honest in- 
quiry directed at discovering economic knowledge; their inquiry met 
with notable success. 
I t  is generally claimed that the tariff advocates had a large major- 
ity of votes when the 1824 debates began, but that during discussion 
of the bill they were "outgeneraled by the free-traders and lost 
much of their majority.l12 While the problem of what motivated men 
to vote as they did is beyond the scope of this paper, we can observe 
possible intellectual reasons for this claim: the free-traders inherited 
their model in complete form from the political economists and were 
able to employ its arguments from the opening day of the debate; 
on the other side, the tariff advocates began with no model and only 
slowly developed one in the course of the debate. Given this vast 
difference in original endowments, perhaps the most remarkable 
aspect of these debates is that the tariff advocates were eventually 
able to present such a cogent defense of the bill on theoretical 
grounds. 
It is readily apparent that comparison of the debates of 1824 and 
1894 reveals a regression of Congressional understanding of the 
economy. Despite having available a more complete set of data and 
a fuller theoretical description of the economy by professional econ- 
omists, the later Congress demonstrated an inability to develop an 
economic perspective commensurate with the analytic task at hand. 
The Congress of 1894 displayed none of the intellectual curiosity 
of their predecessors. The policy positions were strictly defined be- 
fore the debate and never weakened. The intellectual justification 
for either program was not carefully prepared or subjected to tests 
of consistency. There was little discussion of long-range effects be- 
yond emotional or irrational predictions of economic disaster or in- 
creasing bliss. 
This description of the economic sophistication of the American 
Congress at the beginning and end of the nineteenth century sup- 
ports the hypothesis that the nature of Congressional debate itself 
changed during this period. Despite the geographical consistency of 
112 For this view, see Edward Stanwood, American Tariff Controversies in the 
Nineteenth Century ( Cambridge, Mass. : Harvard University Press, 1903), pp. 204- 
207. 
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the actual voting, the content of the debates makes clear that the 
earlier Congress convened for honest debate and discovery of knowl- 
edge through mutual interchange of ideas. The later Congress de- 
bated the issue only as a formality to be endured before the final and 
entirely predictable vote. The explanation of the difference between 
the two periods might well be sought in the respective contexts of 
interests and values in which the debates were staged. 
RICHARD C. EDWARDS, Harvard University 
